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of a moral way of practicing law without

stating, at least summarily, his philosophy of law and relating it
to his philosophy of morals. Two concepts are characteristic of and
basic in natural law jurisprudence: that the legal order is part of the.
moral order, and that the moral order is subject to modification by the
legal order. The same concepts may be expressed in other terms: an
unjust law is no law, and a just law creates, alters and discharges moral
obligations.
Jurisprudence and Justice
Jurisprudence is a science which serves the virtue of justice. Jurisprudence discovers what is just in human law, and justice impels men
to enact, to execute, and to obey laws which are just. The impulse of
the virtue of justice is upon man's will - the virtue of justice is the habit
of choosing those acts and forbearances which, as reason shows, are
means appropriate to realize concretely the abstract principle of justice,
that each shall have what belongs to him. Man's duty to realize in his
conduct the virtue of justice and his duty to choose conduct appropriate
to that end's achievement are moral obligations.
tThe object of this article is to make available, to our readers an integrated outline
statement of natural law jurisprudence in a form which will permit ready reference
in relation to solutions of problems offered in the Section on Morality in Legal
Practice. Detailed footnoting has been intentionally omitted from the present article
because of its basic nature. For readers who wish to pursue research in this area,
THE CATHOLIC LAWYER has planned a series of articles discussing particular aspects

of natural law jurisprudence in which background material will be cited fully.
Meanwhile, our readers' attention is directed to Dr. John C. H. Wu's very useful
article on Law in the Sixth Section, Supplement 11, of the Catholic Encyclopedia.
Father Cahill, in preparing his article, has relied to a very considerable extent upon
the published work of Monsignor Joseph Graneris, especially the monograph
Philosophia luris (1943), the book Contributi Tonistici alla Filosofia del Diritto
(1949), and the articles Monsignor Graneris has contributed to the Dizionario di
Teologia Morale (Roberti ed. 1954). All of these publications can be purchased
through the Libreria at the Ateneo Laterano, Piazza San Giovanni in Laterano,
n. 4, Rome, Italy.
*Priest of the Diocese of Albany. Professor of Law, St. John's University School
of Law.
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Expediency Imposes No
Obligations
Man's only true obligations are those of
morality. The precepts of expediency, which
advise a man what means are effective to
achieve an end or purpose he has chosen
or may choose, do not create obligations.
These precepts do not bind a man's will
to choose the end, and they do not, therefore, oblige him to choose the means which,
as reason indicates, are effective to achieve
the end. "If you want to please X, tell him
*all you know about Y," may be an accurate
statement of the means effective of the end
of pleasing X - it may well be that X
would like nothing better than to know
what you know about Y. But this precept
of expediency imposes no obligation. As an
accurate statement of how you can please
X, it does not assert or imply that you
should please X, nor, consequently, that
you should tell X about Y. Expediency can,
of course, relate pleasing X to a more ulterior end, such as getting a job which is the
gift of X. But expediency's precept will be
still contingent: "If you want this job,
please X, and to please him, tell him about

Obligation Postulates an Absolute
Obligation arises, and morality is involved, when a man must choose an act or
a forbearance. An absolute enters into the
precept, so that it can be said "You must
get the job," or "You must please X," or
"You must tell him about Y." Suppose
that precepts of expediency establish that
getting this job is the only means by which
you can live - you are in a totalitarian
society in which useless persons are liquidated, and you can be useful in no other
job than this one. Whether the maintenance
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of life is an absolute which will oblige you
to get this job, and thus oblige you to please
X, and therefore oblige you to tell him
about Y, depends on what you are.
If the entire significance of man's being
can be exhausted in a description of the
physical conditions upon which his life
depends and of the physical capacities
which his life imports, then life is not, for
him, an absolute. He has no obligation to
choose life and no obligation to choose
death - there is nothing in the world which
the sciences of chemistry, biology, physics
and psychology describe which can say to
him, "You must choose to live" or "You
must choose to die." These sciences can
say what will kill him or keep him alive,
and they can describe the physical, emotional and mental processes which will or
may accompany or follow upon his act of
choosing to live or to die, but they cannot
offer an absolute which will make either
choice an imperative obligation.
Further, the physical world cannot, without destroying man or his consciousness,
control his act of making a choice between
life and death. Physical force can intervene
to destroy the functioning of his nerves, so
that his will's decision cannot be implemented even within his own body, or physical force can inhibit his bodily capacities
or their function, so that his will's decision
cannot be implemented exteriorly. Force
can frustrate the will, and it can influence
the will indirectly, by threat of consequences
to follow on one choice or other, but force
cannot directly control the will.
The Absolute in Human Conduct
The will of man can be directly controlled
only by its proper object. It is the nature of
the will to choose the good, as it is the
nature of the mind to know the true. As
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nature impels the mind to inquire after
the true and to seize upon it in the act of
knowledge, nature impels the will to desire
the good and to seize upon it in the act of
choice. By nature, there is only one object
which can control the will perfectly - one
object which the will cannot but choose.
That object is the absolute and perfect good.
Every concrete object of the will's choice
is presented to the will by the mind, and in
presenting each object, the mind shows it
to be good in some degree. If the mind
could present perfectly to the will an object
absolutely good, the will could not but
choose that object. In this life, however,
the mind cannot present to the will even
the absolute good with such perfect clarity
that the will cannot reject the absolute
good. In the absence of a perfect mental
presentation of the absolute good, the will's
choice of a good object is not inevitable.
Yet the natural response or inclination of
the will is to choose, among several objects
presented to its election, that which the
mind shows to be the greater good. Thus,
the mind's evaluation of the greater or less
goodness of the objects it presents to the
will is the only natural guide which can
directly and intimately influence the will's
act of choosing.
The mind's evaluation of the goodness
of an object has two premises: that, in the
order of being, there is an absolute good,
in reference to which all other real things
are good; and that, in the order of knowledge, the mind can discover, albeit imperfectly,. the real absolute good and its
relations. If, in the order of being, man's
power of choice has no ultimate object, or
if, in the order of knowledge, man can
know no absolute good whose embracement
by willful choice is the raison d'etre of
man's power to choose, then there is no

moral order controlling man's choice, for
it cannot be said that man should or must
choose any particular good rather than any
other.
But if, in the order of being, man is the
creature of an intelligent God, and if man's
mind, by employing the concepts of cause
and effect, can discover that fact, then
there is a real order. That order, examined
by man through the concepts of end and
means, directs man's acts of choice to an
ultimate and absolute good. The act by
which an intelligent God creates is an intelligent act and, as such, must have purpose. The ultimate purpose of the Supreme
Being can be only Itself. If that Being
creates man with a will capable of choosing
good and the Creator Himself is supremely
good, then the ultimate purpose of this
creative act, and the purpose binding absolutely upon the will created, must be that
the created power of choice shall choose,
that is, shall love, its Creator.
Thus, the will of man, in its creation, is
bound by the obligation to choose God as
against any other thing which may be presented to it as an' alternative object of
choice. This is the root principle of all
man's obligations. The ultimate end of
man's choosing, as of man's being, is God
- that end is the absolute which imposes
upon man the obligation to choose with his
will no object whose choice turns man, in
any degree, from his ultimate end.
Reason Discovers the Order of
Being and the Order of Morals
The detailed design for human conduct
which leads man to God as his ultimate
natural end is the natural moral order - it
is an aspect of the natural order of being
which is the detailed design of God's creative act. From time to time in human
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history, God has communicated to men, by
the supernatural act called revelation, some
of the principles which describe the order
of being and the moral order established
by the divine act of creation. Yet the principles of the order of being and the moral
order set up in the act of creation are open
to discovery by human reason.
These natural orders do not preclude
God's establishing, by acts distinct from
the act of creation, supernatural orders of
being and of morality. God has in fact,
without altering essentially man's created
nature, destined man to share in the divine
life of God Himself. That destiny gives to
man grace-a new principle of activity,
distinct from his natural life. This supernatural vital principle puts man in a new
order of being-the order of divine sonship-which is distinct from the order of
created nature. That man is established in
this new order of being implies that there
is for his conduct a new moral order. These
supernatural orders, of being and of morals,
differ from, but do not destroy or essentially alter the natural orders of being and
morality. The principles of the supernatural
orders cannot be discovered by natural
human reason unaided-they can be known
by reason when reason is helped by the
supernatural aid called faith.
The Principles of the Natural Order
of Being
The mind of man applies to the phenomena of the physical world the intuitive
rational principles of causality and sufficient
reason, to discover the principles of the
natural order of being. Some of the principles clearly validated by this intellectual
inquiry are these: that the world is the
product of the creative act of the one, supreme, infinite, intelligent and free God;
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that the ultimate end of man's existence is
God -that the union with God to which
man is naturally destined is a union of
understanding and of free will choice, or
love.
The order of being and its principles
concern facts and factual relations, susceptible to discovery by the process of
"speculative reason" which has for its basic
tools the concepts of cause and effect, and
for its purpose the discovery of what is true.
The relations discovered and described are
chiefly necessary ones, which cannot be
other than they are in fact. The conclusions
of speculative reason as to the principles
of the order of being are, therefore, endowed with a high degree of certainty.
The Principles of the Natural Moral
Order
The nature of man, as described by the
principles of the order of being, is examined under the concepts of end and means,
-in order to discover the principles of the
moral order by which man's conduct is
guided. Man's nature, as the subject of this
examination, is man's entire and integral
nature - the inclinations of nature are
guides to moral principles of conduct only
in so far as they are the inclinations of
reason or the inclinations of other parts of
human nature ruled by reason.
The purpose of this process is to discover
what is good, that is, to perceive the order
which relates the objects which man's will
may embrace as good, among themselves
and to the absolute good. This last is the
ultimate object of man's willful choice, it is
God, to Whom man unites himself by understanding choice - by the act called love.
Some of the basic principles of the moral
order are: good - whatever contributes to
the union of man's will with God's will -
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must be done, and evil must be avoided;
human life, as a moral value, is superior to
any value involving property only; an evil
means, employed to accomplish a good end,
is nonetheless evil. The moral evaluation
of many particular ends, such as the destruction or preservation of human life and
liberty, as good or evil, can be made with
a high degree of certainty, since the reasoning process there involved is chiefly deductive. The particular end is viewed with
reference to man's ultimate end of union
with God, and the causal relation between
the ultimate and the particular is adequately
perceived. But the evaluation of many other
particular ends, and the evaluation of means
for achieving many particular ends in the
concrete, involve causal relations too unclear to warrant a conclusion by deduction.
Evaluation can be made inductively - this
type of conduct has good moral results in
this case and in that case, and in the other
case -or it has evil moral results in so
many other cases. Many of the conclusions
available to reason in these matters are,
therefore, products of incomplete induction, which cannot yield perfect certainty.
Yet if the conclusions are so highly probable as to exclude reasonable doubt, they
are said to be morally certain - in matters
of human conduct it is often practically
impossible to achieve perfect certainty, and
human action would be paralyzed if it had
to wait upon that achievement. Conclusions
which are less probable, having only "the
greater weight of probability," and even
those having lesser weight yet being "supported by solid reason," have significance
as guides to human conduct in circumstances where the obligation to act with
care or to act only after inquiry-is relatively
lighter.
Reason's search for the true principles

of the natural moral order is sometimes
aided by revelation. God, speaking in a
supernatural way, through the Scriptural
writers He inspired and through the infallible teaching of His Church, has indicated
clearly some natural moral principles whose
discovery is difficult and even uncertain
when they are sought only in the indications of nature. Revelation helps reason in
these matters, not only directly, by stating
the true principles explicitly, but even indirectly, by calling to the mind's attention
some aspects of nature whose moral significance, on first view, was not clear. Thus
the conclusions of moralists in respect of
duties bearing upon the life of the unborn
have been clarified and even revised in the
light of Church doctrine which implies that
the human rational soul is infused in the
first instant of conception.
The Legal Order Is Part of the

Moral Order
The legal order is one sector of the
natural moral order. God, in creating man,
has ordained that to accomplish the perfection of his nature man shall live in community with other men. To direct the
conduct of men to the purposes which the
community, by divine ordination, serves,
the community is given a share in God's
power to bind the will of man - to impose
upon men true moral obligations.

The Legal Order Distinguished
Within the Moral Order
Any man can be said to bind the conscience of any other man when he brings
to the attention of the other a precept of
the moral order which is applicable to
conduct that the other contemplates. Like
the moral counsellor, the lawmaker urges
his subjects to obey the precepts, such as
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that against theft, which are conclusively,
that is,I deductively, imposed by the principles of the moral order. But, unlike the
counsellor, the lawmaker can morally bind
his subjects also by precepts which impose
categorically ends and means which the
natural law imposes only alternatively.
If I have wilfully broken through my
neighbor's fence, the natural law obliges
me to repair the harm done and to prevent
further harm. In a given situation - I being
a competent workman and having at hand
the appropriate materials - a moral counsellor might advise me that the best means
of fulfilling my moral obligations would be
to repair the fence immediately, though he
would have to say that I would do no
wrong if I chose rather to warn my neighbor
of what had happened and to stand ready
to make money compensation for his harm.
The law, having to adapt itself to the common rather than the special situation, may
prescribe money payment and allow me no
credit for repairs, even when competently
made, unless they had been accepted by
the owner of the fence. If that is the law,
my neighbor may morally stand upon it,
and if he does so, I am morally bound to
obey it.
But it is the coercive moral power of the
lawmaker which essentially distinguishes
him from the moral counsellor. While the
counsellor can employ only reasoned instruction and persuasion to bring his client
to voluntarily fulfill the moral precept, the
lawmaker's distinctive power is to bind his
subject morally to a coerced, involuntary,
obedience. As was said when force was
discussed, the human will's choice cannot
be internally coerced. The law's external
coercion differs from brute force in this,
that the law's coercion, though it involves,
directly or indirectly, an exercise of physi-

CATHOLIC

LAWYER,

WINTER

1958

cal force, is legitimated in the moral order
by the divine mandate to society. That
mandate morally obliges the members of a
society to accept the force which society
reasonably exercises to coerce obedience
of just laws.
It is this attribute of "coercibility" the legal precept's quality of being able to
achieve its objective where the subject's
will does not embrace the law's objective,
and even where the subject's will positively
rejects the law's objective - which distinguishes the law from all other precepts in
the moral order. It is this coercive quality
of the precepts of the legal order which
sets apart from the moral order in general
that special area thereof which we call the
legal or juridical order. The objective of
the moral precept against murder - the
moral perfection achieved by one who willingly obeys the precept - is not achieved
where a man, fully wishing to kill his
neighbor, forbears to do so for fear of
punishment. But the objectives of the legal
precept-the immunity of any individual
from unjust death and that external peace
which all the neighbors need to accomplish
their moral self-perfection - are achieved in
such a case.
The lawmaker does not and need not use
his moral power to the full limits of its
potential, in every case.
When he prescribes conduct required by
natural moral precepts, the lawmaker adds
nothing to the moral obligation to act or
forbear in the subject matter, but he attaches a coercion to conduct violative of
the precept. The specific moral obligation
thus created- that the subject shall accept
the just coercion of the law - is the lawmaker's only contribution to the moral
situation.
When the lawmaker prescribes a line of
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conduct not conclusively imposed by natural law, he always contributes this moral
obligation to accept just coercion. He may,
and usually does, impose also a moral
obligation as to the specific line of conduct
he directs -it is immoral to drive to the
left on Broadway, and to drive to the right
in Piccadilly Circus. But the lawmaker need
not impose a moral obligation as to the
specific line of conduct he directs - he may
choose to oblige his subjects "only to the
penalty of the law." The intent thus to
limit the exercise of the law's moral potential seems quite clear in the matter of one
or two-hour parking limitations. The conduct forbidden is not naturally harmful or
dangerous, nor are the rights of property
or other rights of commutative justice involved, nor is the common good seriously
affected. Thus, the sense of seriously conscientious men appears to support the view
that the only moral obligation of the overtime parker is to obey the summons lawfully
issued and to pay the fine which the court
imposes.
But if the lawmaker intends that his
precept shall have no moral obligation
whatever, he abdicates his character of
lawmaker, and becomes either a mere counsellor or a tyrant. If he urges a line of
conduct without being prepared to coerce
it in any way, he is a counsellor merely.
If he prescribes conduct not mandated by
natural law, with intent that his command
shall not morally oblige his subjects, but
imposing a coercion which reasoned morality does not oblige the subjects to accept,
he is a complete tyrant. In either case, the
enactment is not law.
The lawmaker differs also from the parent, but in a different respect. The parent,
like the state, can coerce unwilling obedience, because the parent has responsibility

for the child's external welfare, as the state
has such responsibility in respect of its
citizens. But the parent is also entrusted by
nature with the internal perfection of his
child. Therefore, the parent's command can
bind his child morally even in matters in
which obedience cannot be coerced. Thus
the parent shares God's power, not shared
by the state, to bind the conscience directly,
without coercion.
It is a principle of the natural moral
order that every human law, if it be just,
binds the subject's conscience, to observe
the law or at least to accept its coercion.
It is not necessary that the lawmaker actually advert to the fact that his law imposes
an obligation of conscience, nor that he
believe in or understand the moral order
which makes his law effective in the realm
of conscience. If he is exercising power
legitimated .to him by the natural law, every
just law, by which he intends to bind his
subjects in any way, binds them in conscience.
The Test of the Human Enactment

as Just Law
The divine mandate, embodied in human
nature, which empowers the community to
regulate its subjects' conduct by imposing
upon them moral obligations and morally
effective sanctions, is the ultimate criterion
by which human law is morally evaluated.
A social enactment which goes beyond that
mandate is not a just law -indeed, it is
not a law in any real sense - it is only' the
shadow' or shell or semblance of a law.
Examined by reason, the divine mandate is
seen to imply four principles upon which
a social enactment can be evaluated as a
just law, effective in the moral and juridical
orders.
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First Principle:A human law is not just
if it is contrary to higher law, that is, to
the natural law or the divine positive
law
The natural moral order and the natural
law are products of God's intelligent and
wilfull act of creation. It is inconceivable
that the supernatural order, which the
same Divine Wisdom has established for
men, should essentially conflict with the natural moral law. Nor is it conceivable that the
law-making power of the human community, if reasonably exercised and so morally
effective, should forbid or require conduct
which the supernatural order requires or
forbids. Human law, therefore, cannot impose or discharge moral bbligations in derogation of the divine positive law. Thus, a
human law which purported to forbid the
use of wine for the Sacrament of the Eucharist would be manifestly unjust and morally
ineffective.
Since it is the natural moral order which
validates the power of the human community to make true law, the exercise of
that power cannot rise above its source, as
it would do if it could competently make
law contrary to a rule of conduct which
follows as a necessary conclusion from the
principles of natural law. Thus a law which
directs mutilation not required for the subject's own health nor reasonably imposed
as punishment for wrongdoing is unjust.
A human law is unjust, not only when
its command runs counter to a principle
of the higher law, but also when it fails to
enact rules of conduct which are necessary
conclusions from the higher law, as if, for
example, a legal system would in no way
forbid murder, or would permit self defense
in no circumstances.
The rules of human conduct which are
necessary conclusions from natural law
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and divine positive law are relatively few
in number, as compared with the total number of the moral law's precepts and prohibitions. Most concrete moral rules of
human conduct are premised upon the
judgment that the conduct in question tends
toward'fulfillment or toward frustration of
the principles of natural law. These principles require, among other things, that
man in society contribute to the common
good - this requirement will be discussed
in detail under the Third Principle and
thereafter. The judgment of tendency is
usually a contingent one, being dependent
upon concrete circumstances which vary
from time to time, from place to place, and
even from person to person. In this area,
the human enactment cannot execute its
divine mandate by implementing conclusions of higher law, for the conclusions of
higher law in these matters are not open
to certain discovery by human wisdom.
Reason can show men only a probability
that the concrete act tends to fulfill or
frustrate a natural law principle. Such probabilities are the bases for human enactments
which determine obligations which the
principles of natural law do not impose
conclusively upon men. Where a person
would be unjustly enriched at the expense
of another if he were permitted to retain
property to which he has title, the natural
law obliges him to, somehow, save that
other from harm. Our law determines a
precise way in which this duty shall be
performed - the title owner is subjected
to the specific obligations of a "constructive
trustee."
Out of the contingent quality of the judgment that a specific act or line of conduct
fulfills or frustrates principles of the higher
law, arises a prime requirement in respect
of human enactments which foster or in-
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hibit such conduct. This requirement is
that the enactment shall be implemented
only after mature deliberation. It is this
principle which founds our constitutional
requirements of orderly legislative process,
of freedom of speech, assembly and petition, of executive veto and judicial review.
The principle justifies also the concepts that
the law should be applied under the supervision of trained judges, by juries subject to
challenge, and that judges should explain
their findings openly and in terms of "artificial reason."
Second Principle: A human law is not
just if it is made without competence
Competence here has a three-fold reference. The law-making authority of a community is legitimated to the person or
persons exercising it where the community
has somehow consented to its exercise by
that person or persons. Jurisdiction is determined, generally, by the physical limits
of the community whose legitimated authority makes the enactment. Special consideration must be given here to the competency
of the community and of its law-making
authority to legislate upon a specific moral
subject matter.
It seems difficult, where the enactment
simply prohibits or simply forbids, clearly
to distinguish the concept of competence
in the subject matter of an enactment from
the principles requiring that the human
enactment shall violate no higher law (First
Principle, supra), and that the enactment
shall be directed to the common* good
(Third Principle, infra). Yet it seems
reasonable to suggest that since the natural
scope of the civil society's common good
is the material conditions which further the
development of the human personality, the
civil society is not competent, for example,

to enact laws which command or forbid
purely mental acts. Also, it seems correct
to say that commands and prohibitions directly violative of a higher law are not only
unjust but incompetent. The higher law has
"preempted" competence to regulate the
subject matter.
The distinction is clearer where the precise moral subject matter which the enactment purports to affect is not a simple
command or prohibition, but rather the
extinction of an existing moral obligation.
For example, the law of the state empowers
an infant to rescind a valid contract. When
the infant does so, he is discharged from
the moral obligation to perform, which had
arisen out of his act of making the contract. Thus the law, through the power of
rescission which it gives to the infant, extinguishes an existing moral obligation. This
the civil society is competent to do where
the obligation respects property, but the
natural law makes the state incompetent
to extinguish the moral obligations which
arise out of a valid contract of marriage.
The common law, in the days when it
predicated itself upon the natural law,
never purported to void a marriage which
had been valid ab initio. The limit of the
civil society's power in respect of marriage
is this: for persons whose marriages are
not confided by divine mandate to the
competence of some other society, the law
of the civil society can, with full moral
effect, invalidate ab initio marriages truly
adverse to the common good of that society
- secret marriages, for example, because
such marriages create social and moral
jeopardy for the parties and for other
persons as well.
Another example illustrates the incompetence of human law in the area of property, an area which, generally, is within
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human legislative competence. A law of
prescription or of adverse possession has
no moral effect to extinguish. an owner's
rights or to create ownership in a possessor
where the possessor has not good faith. If
he takes or holds the thing in violation of
a duty, known subjectively to him, not to
take it or to hand it over to its owner, the
law does not extinguish his moral obligations or the owner's moral rights. The law
cannot, morally, put a premium upon conscious wrongdoing, whatever it may be able
to do for a man who does wrong ignorantly.
The concept of competence in the moral
subject matter is seen most clearly where
a divine positive law has deprived a human
society of competence in a moral area which
had belonged to it by natural law. The
Christian revelation denies to the state any
competence to enact laws respecting the
validity of marriages contracted by baptized
persons. In the supernatural order, such
marriages are given a special character
which differentiates them from natural contracts of marriage. Thus they are withdrawn
from the civil jurisdiction which has competence to legislate, reasonably, upon the
validity ab initio of the marriages of unbaptized persons.
Third Principle: A human law is not
just if it is not directed to the common
good
Under natural law, the end or purpose
of civic life is to preserve, develop, and
perfect the human person, by providing
external conditions needed by the citizens
as a whole to develop their qualities and
to fulfill their duties in every sphere of life
-material,
intellectual and religious. It
follows that the ends of society are no other
than the ends of human life. Conduct con-
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ducive to the ends' of society is an obligation of the society's members, imposed as
such by the order of being and the moral
order, which require men to live in society
in order to have aids necessary to perform
their duties to God. The common good of
society must include the individual's immunity from interference in those goods he
needs to fulfill his moral duties, and it must
include also those external conditions which
are needed for the full human development
of the citizens as a whole.
A law which promotes conditions needful to the citizens as a whole, but which
invades even one individual's necessary
moral immunity, is an unjust law. Thus,
a tax law which is generally equitable and
furthers the economic well being of the
whole group of citizens, is unjust to the
extent that it directly makes an individual
unable to obtain by his labor the bare
necessities of life.
Laws, like that on adverse possession of
realty, which extinguish moral rights of one
individual in favor of another, serve the
general needs of society, yet they are not
just laws if they do not respect the necessary
moral immunity of the individual deprived.
When owners leave their lands long unused
and unoccupied, society is deprived of benefits which accrue to it from the occupancy
and exploitation of the land - these are
benefits which are truly significant and even
necessary to the general welfare. No one
will trouble to maintain or improve lands
neglected by their owners if the improver
can be turned out at any time by the neglectful owner or even by that owner's
remote successors. Yet the law of adverse
possession would be unjust if it gave title
to a possessor who came upon the land
and occupied it without any act reasonably
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calculated to give notice to the owner that
his title was in jeopardy, or if the law gave
title to one whose entry and occupation
had been licensed by the owner himself.
On the other hand, society has no true
good which is not a good in reference to
the human development of its citizens.
Therefore, a law which, though it did not
invade any individual's reserve of necessary
moral immunity yet did not foster conditions needful to the whole group of citizens,
is not a just law. Thus, in a society where
the financial needs of the community could
be provided for adequately by an equitable
income tax, a capital levy would be unjust
to the extent that it would discourage thrift
and enterprise.
Society may reasonably and justly forbid
a citizen, even directly, to take alcoholic
drink, if the prohibition serves a true need
of the societal group. The need appears
clearly where the prohibition is particularized, as, for example, in respect of soldiers and policemen on duty or of persons
operating vehicles, in public. But that any
such need is actually served by a general
prohibition law, which forbids the act of
drinking directly or even indirectly, by barring liquor from commerce, does not clearly
appear.
The intelligent application of this principle of the common good requires not only
that attention be given to its philosophical
implications. Careful attention to the data
of the social sciences is also required. With
proper reservations made as to their philosophical implications, the explorations of
such jurisprudents as Pound and Fuller in
the matters of social interests and the practical principles of social order are valuable
aids in assessing the justice of a law from
the viewpoint of its direction to the common good.

Fourth Principle: A human law is not
just if it inequitably distributes benefits
and burdens among the members oj the
community
The benefits and burdens which the law
distributes are measured not only in physical terms of material things taken and
given, and of physical labor required or
dispensed with. Even such material items
are viewed, by morality and by just law,
in the light of human needs, more or less
urgent and more or less closely related to
the individual's necessary immunity and to
the common good. Neither these considerations of human need nor the correlative
considerations of human capacity are limited to objects mensurable in terms of matter and energy-the needs and the capacities
of the extraordinary person, the ordinary
person, the immature person, the person
handicapped by nature or by circumstances
or by the activity of those who are more
competent or more powerful, must be assessed also in terms of mental and moral
resources. There is not true equity where
a man's goods and labor are respected but
he is burdened with unreasonable duties of
inquiry and foresight which shackle his
freedom of action.
Finally this complex human situation is
regulated by a device which, though it may
appear subtle and overly delicate to the layman, is known to its ministers for the gross
and crude instrument that it is. The law itself, being the product of generalization
upon immensely diverse situations, and being an attempt to coerce activities whose
true objectives are often beyond coercion's
reach, cannot distribute with perfect equality even those benefits and burdens whose
measure is open to clear and exact determination. Many of the law's crudities are
ameliorated when the jurisprudent and the
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lawmaker view the law from the standpoint
of Professor Fuller's thesis on the Principles of Order. And while one deplores the
philosophical myopia of the analytical jurisprudents he cannot adequately serve justice
if he ignores their scientific contributions as
means by which-the law can be so shaped
as to react sensitively to the subtle demands
of true equity.
Despite the complexity of the law's subject matter and the crudeness of the legal
instrument, practical reason, instructed by
moral philosophy and legal science, can
judge that the burdens and benefits of a
given law are equitably or inequitably distributed to such degree that the law is just
or unjust, and thus effective or not in the
orders of law and of morals.
All Moral Obligations are Created
by Some Law
In the moral order, the concept of duty
or obligation is antecedent to the correlative concept of right. There is in one man
a moral claim upon another's act or forbearance, only if the other is obliged by the
moral order so to act or so to forbear. Because each man has duties to God which
he cannot perform without the concurrence
of others, each man has moral rights against
other men, individually and collectively,
for their necessary concurrence. It is because men have duties to God which can
be performed only by community living,
that the community has from God moral
power to impose upon individuals in the
community coercive moral obligations,
which give rise to correlative rights in the
community and in its members. The same
duties to God premise the moral power of
the human community to defend itself
against outsiders who would destroy it or
unreasonably impede its proper function.
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The just human law can coerce obligations imposed categorically by natural law,
and it can impose categorically moral obligations which are not so imposed by the
law of nature. These latter obligations, made
categorical by the human law, derive from
natural law mediately - through the general precept of natural law requiring men
to fulfill their moral duties to God. The
duties, for example, to conserve one's life
and to provide for one's family, are imposed by that general -precept, and their
performance requires men to live in community. The duty to live in community is
not fulfilled by man's physical presence,
among others. He lives in community, truly
and humanly, when his way of life is directed, by charity, justice and prudence, to
the common good of the community. The
competent and equitable laws of society,
directed to the common good; are effective
to impose as categorical obligations of justice, moral obligations which the natural
law imposes only alternatively, and also
moral obligations whose-only natural moral
quality is their derivation from the natural
duty to live in society and to contribute by
one's lawful conduct to the advancement
of the common good.
No individual, by his act done in absence
of law, can bind himself to another or another to himself, either legally or morally.
An individual, hitherto free of a specific obligation or not possessed of a specific right,
can voluntarily do an act which has such
impact upon the moral order that morality
imposes upon him that obligation, or gives
him that right. A promise could not bind its
maker to its fulfillment if his act of making
the promise did not bring his performance
of the conduct promised under the moral
precept of fidelity. The voluntary acceptance of another's offer to promise con-
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tractually could not give the offeree a moral
right to demand performance if his act of
acceptance did not bring the promisor
under the moral precept of commutative
justice, by giving to the promisor that act
or promise for which he bargained his
promise.
The operative precept, under which one
is brought by his act or by the act of another,
may be one imposed conclusively or alternatively by natural law, whether the precept
be coerced or not by human law. It may be
one imposed by just human law which determines or specifies and coerces an obligation that is only alternative in natural law.
Or, finally, it may be a precept imposed by
a just law which makes obligatory and coerces, for the sake of the common good,
conduct not prescribed by natural law,
either conclusively or alternatively.
Moral Obligations Created and
Discharged by Human Law
Where the just human law creates a moral
obligation which would not have come into
existence in the absence of such law, there
is no difficulty in perceiving that the entire
content of the obligation derives immediately from the human law in question. And
it is clear that the human law can discharge
its subject from the obligations the law itself
has imposed.
This sort of moral obligation is exemplified by the great mass of moral duties which
arise directly out of the law's exercise of its
moral power to coerce. When a just law
coerces performance of some obligation by
its subject, one can always distinguish the
subject's obligation to suffer coercion from
any duty of the subject, the performance of
which is the objective of the coercive law.
Unless and until the legal machinery of
coercion is made to operate in his regard,

neither the duty whose performance is the
objective of legal coercion, nor the mere
existence of the coercive law, imposes any
obligation upon the subject to suffer the
coercion that the legal machinery is designed
to impose. And if the coercive law limits its
machinery's function in regard to the subject, his obligation to suffer its operation is
thus curtailed.
Thus, for example, the court cannot,
legally or morally, apply coercion to a person who has not been made a defendant
before it. A person against whom no complaint or accusation has been made - even
by a judge in a situation where a judge may
accuse on his own motion-has no obligation
to suffer any detriment prescribed by a statute, or considered by the court, as appropriate to an act this person has done. And if
the law permits a person, made defendant
by complaint or accusation, to stop the
process of legal coercion by bringing some
fact to the attention of the court, the defendant is freed of any moral obligation to
suffer coercion premised upon the complaint
or accusation.
Even if the law gives the complainant an
action and gives no defense to this action,
the only moral obligation imposed by the
law upon the defendant is to suffer the coercion lawfully incidental to or resulting
from the activity of a court where the cause
is pleaded and proved. He is obliged by
natural law, even though the human law
should not re-enact this obligation, to use
no unjust means to defeat the action against
him, or to diminish the recovery to which
the complainant is by just law entitled.
For greater reason, if the law authorizes
no coercion against a man -his conduct
gives no cause of action - he has no obligation to permit a court, moved by his moral
wrongdoing alleged in a complaint or accu-
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sation, to coerce him in the matter of such
conduct. Yet, in such case, his morally
wrongful conduct may subject him to the
obligation to submit to the naturally just
coercion of his victim's reasonable self-defense or self-help.
Moral Obligations Specified or
Determined by Human Law and

Discharged Thereby
When a natural moral obligation is such
that it can be performed by any one of several lines of conduct, these conduct patterns may be said to be alternatively obligatory. An example was given above (page
28) in distinguishing the legal order within
the moral order. A just human law is competent to limit the choice of the subject to
some, or even to one, of the naturally adequate performances - such a law is said to
"specify" or "determine" natural law.
When the law has done this, the subject
may discharge his original obligation by a
performance the law does not accept, but he
cannot thus discharge his full moral duty.
To fulfill the moral obligation imposed by
the specifying or determining human law,
he must give a legal performance. Sometimes the law itself concludes upon his
choice - one cannot satisfy his full moral
obligation to contribute to community needs
by making gifts to charity, or even to the
state, in lieu of paying just taxes. In other
laws, the individual who is beneficiary of the
subject's obligation has the right to insist
upon legal performance, but the subject
satisfies the law if a legally inadequate performance is accepted by his obligee - e.g.,
a buyer may waive his right of inspection.
A just law, in specifying the mode of performing a natural obligation may exclude by
prohibition some mode or modes morally
adequate. A food rationing law, for ex-
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ample, could quite justly punish and even
make invalid the act of paying a debt by
surrender of rationed essentials.
Finally, a human law may forbid all of
the performances to which the natural law
alternatively obliges. Such a law is, of course,
equivalent to a human law which affects an
obligation of natural law for whose performance only one means is available to the
subject- an obligation imposed categorically and affirmatively by natural law. That
problem will be discussed in the section next
following; the present section will advert
only to human laws which let stand or which
enforce at least one of a set of performances
morally adequate in natural law.
Under that limitation, human law does
not conflict with higher law, for the performance required is morally adequate in
natural law, and the performance human
law forbids is morally optional. Given
competence in the subject matter, direction
to the common good, and equitableness,
there appears no reason why human laws
thus limited should not justly specify natural
obligations which are alternative, even forbidding some performances naturally adequate.
Nor is there any difficulty in understanding that a just law may, either in general or
in a given case, decline to enforce a moral
obligation hitherto determined by it, or cease
to forbid a morally adequate alternative
performance hitherto prohibited. But where
a performance morally and legally adequate
has satisfied the moral obligation, the human
law cannot "revive" the natural obligation.
Here it can create a new obligation -not
specifying an obligation alternative in natural law, for that was discharged by performance, but imposing an obligation which
is warranted by the general precept of natural law requiring men to live in community
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and to seek there the common good.
Where two or more natural moral obligations are closely related, one must be careful not to argue from the law's specification
of means for performing one obligation that
the other or others are extinguished. Thus,
defamation by a lie involves the moral obligations to make the truth known and to
repair material harm. Payment under a
judgment for damages may fulfill the latter
obligation, and leave the former outstanding
because, for example, though the plaintiff
could prove legal malice - the absence of
privilege - he could not prove mala fides.
Moral Obligations, Imposed Categorically by Natural Law and
Discharged by Human Law
These moral obligations include those
which have only one naturally adequate
mode of performance, and those for whose
performance only one adequate means is
available to the subject.
The former are categorical negative obligations. The individual man's obligation
not to take directly human life, unless in
necessary repulse of unjust aggression, cannot be performed in any way but by forbearing always to do what the precept
forbids. The law which directs the executioner, and the law which compels the
soldier sharpshooter to kill a sleeping
enemy, do not discharge those persons from
the obligations of the common precept.
Those laws cover cases which are not subject to the precept, for the precept does not
forbid society, or its lawful agent deputed
thereunto, to take the life of one who,
though his aggression has ceased, had attacked society by serious crime; nor does
it forbid society to kill a person who is agent
of another society which is engaged in active
unjust aggression, though the agent is not

at this moment engaged in an aggressive act.
Laws which can be shown to prescribe or
permit conduct only physically and not
morally similar to conduct forbidden by a
natural moral precept will stand as just
if they meet the tests of competency, the
common good, and equitableness. But laws
which prescribe or permit conduct forbidden by such a precept are in conflict with
higher law, and cannot be justified by considerations of competency, common good,
or equitableness. They are not law - they
neither impose nor discharge moral obligations.
A law may, if it is competent, directed
to the common good, and equitable, justly
permit to its subject conduct contrary to an
affirmative moral precept of the natural law,
and may justly forbid conduct prescribed by
such a precept.
The former effect is had where the law
imposes a duty whose performance makes
impossible the subject's performance of the
natural moral duty. Such laws must be
tested carefully, with particular reference
to their equitableness and to the possibility
that they invade the subject's necessary
moral immunity. Laws which, for the sake
of technical education or military training,
would leave no practical opportunity for
religious practice over long periods, would
be unjust. Laws which, for the needs of public security, require service excluding all
such opportunities in true emergencies, and
some such opportunities at other times,
would be just, if the needs were real and
proportionate.
A law which is competent, directed to the
common good, and equitable can justly forbid conduct prescribed by a categorical but
affirmative natural moral duty. The considerations of individual immunity and equitableness are, again, most pertinent. National
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security regulations can justly forbid one
to give information to another who, without
it, will suffer great harm and even perish,
despite the natural obligation of charity to
to aid another in his extreme peril. The obligation of justice exceeds that of charity.
Just law cannot forbid an individual citizen,
upon whom the law has placed no special
duty serving the common good, to risk his
goods and his life in performance of a moral
duty imposed by natural law.
Human Laws Which Invalidate Acts
Ab Initio
Where an act's object, as established by
higher law, is to produce an obligation and
a right, the human law can prevent creation
of the obligation only by preventing the act
from achieving its object.
Just human law is competent, by divine
commission implied in nature and expressed
in revelation, to bind morally the wills of its
subjects. Clearly, the law, even the law of
God, cannot physically make a man will a
prescribed act or physically prevent him
(while his faculties are intact) from willing
a forbidden act.
It is, however, the teaching of Christian
moralists that the law can reach the will of
its subjects more intimately than by morally
binding command or prohibition. The human law, like the divine law, can reach the
will of a man at the point where the will
chooses to do an act whose moral object,
as established by moral law, is to create
rights and obligations. At that point, the law
can prevent the will from effectuating the
object of the act it has chosen. Thus intervening, a just human law prevents moral
rights and obligations from arising out of
an act whose moral object is to create them.
Such a law is an invalidating law in the strict
sense. In common law matters, there are
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few such laws - the legal incompetency
to contract, even in a lucid interval, after
inquest of office found, is an example. In
the matter of exercising statutory rights,
even the right to vote, strictly invalidating
laws are quite common.
Human Laws Which Extinguish
Existing Moral Obligations
A just law can discharge an existing
moral obligation, whether or not that obligation is one created by an act of the subject. Some such laws, like the law regarding
rescission of infants' contracts, are described
as voiding a valid act, which is a figure of
speech used to suggest that the net or final
situation is the same as the situation would
have been if the act had been void ab initio.
Whether or not the legal effects of a given
voiding law are exactly the same as those of
an invalidating law in the same premises,
does not concern us here. Certainly the
moral effects cannot be the same in every
respect.
The voiding law extinguishes moral obligations which have existed for some time
at least - the time elapsed between the act
now voided and the present application of
the law to void the act. The law cannot
change, though it can ignore, past moral
facts. If in the period elapsed, the person
obliged has fulfilled the moral duties imposed by the act, he has acted morally or
virtuously - or it may be that he has acted
immorally, or that another has acted morally or immorally, in respect of the moral
rights and obligations created by the act.
The moral quality of such past acts cannot
be changed. What the law can change is the
rights and obligations now existing or which
may arise in the future, and whose existence
derives or will derive from the act in question.
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If a moral obligation is of a sort that
the human law can prevent from arising,
reason suggests no cause to doubt that the
law can extinguish that obligation after it
has arisen.
Human Laws Which Make Rights

Unenforcible
When the coercive effect of a human law
is terminated, there is often a practical difficulty in deciding whether obligations and
rights whose performance or protection was
the objective of the law are also terminated.
This difficulty cannot arise, obviously, in
reference to the withdrawal of the human
law's coercion of obligations categorically
imposed by natural law. Where the original
obligation was an alternative one in natural
law, several results are possible. If the sense
of the specifying or determining human law
was to forbid a natural alternative, that prohibition disappears when the coercion is removed. If the coercion is withdrawn with
respect to all of the alternatives hitherto
made legally adequate, the situation reverts
to what it was originally - all the natural alternatives are morally adequate. If it is
withdrawn in respect of not all, those still
coerced are alone morally adequate.
Where the obligation was one imposed
purely by the human law (for the common
good, of course), the withdrawal of coercion removes the obligation for the future,
unless there remains in the legal system
some other coercion of the same obligation.
In no case does the withdrawal of coercion, by itself, have the effect of voiding
rights acquired under the law. Those rights
can be extinguished only by a new enactment whose effect is coercible in the legal
system.
Where the extinguishing effect of the law

as to acquired rights is explicit, as it is in
the Negotiable Instruments Law and in the
Sales Acts, there is little practical difficulty.
Where there is a binding construction of
the law in this sense, the difficulty is not
great - we have this in the common law of
adverse possession of real property. Where
there is neither of these indications that the
law intends to extinguish rights and obligations, and not merely to give over enforcing
them, a problem may arise in the practical
situation. If the possessor of personalty,
for example, is given all the coercive aids
which the law lends to an owner, and the
owner of the same personalty is denied any
aid whatever, do we need an express statute
or a venerable line of judicial opinion to
conclude that the law here attributes ownership to the possessor?
Which of These Three Effects Does
the Law Intend?
Invalidating laws work greater hardship
than voiding laws, and voiding laws impose
a greater burden than laws which merely
deny or limit enforcement of rights. Therefore the moralists apply here the rule that
burdensome laws are strictly construed. The
law which is reasonably patient of more
than one interpretation is construed in that
sense which will impose the lesser burden.
The rule can be applied, of course, only
when the application of other tests has
failed to make the law's meaning clear. We
should note here the doctrine of the moralists that a law's effect in the realm of conscience need not be explicitly intended by
the lawmaker. It is enough that he intends
(in the context of these three types of law)
to prevent legal obligations arising from the
act, or to extinguish legal duties and rights
which have been created by the act, or to
deny a remedy while leaving legal rights
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and obligations where they stood before
this denial.
A given law may intend to prevent rights
arising, or to void rights, or merely to deny
them enforcement. The language of the law,
its context, declarations of legislative intent,
the rules of interpretation and construction,
and the opinions of competent and conscientious men, well informed in the subject
matter, are means of learning the law's
intent.
A Challenge and a Caveat
It seems scarcely necessary to point explicitly to the challenge which natural law
jurisprudence issues. It challenges the men
of law to find its roots in infinite truth, to
follow where truth leads, and to stand with
truth against brute force, and against an intellectuality so refined that it can see no
truth or at least no certain truth.
The caveat needs to be stated more explicitly. The task of assessing the justice of
human law, as that of judging any moral
matter in the concrete, involves serious
danger of moral or intellectual arrogance. In
most of these tasks, we are dealing with matters which we cannot know, through unaided human reason, with metaphysical,
mathematical, or physical certainty. We
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have to rely heavily upon practical or moral
certainty, and this reliance involves resort to
devices more or less artificial. We regard
some generalities, of fact or of principle, as
being "in possession," because they are the
carefully gathered and interpreted data of
common and prolonged human experience.
Conclusions contrary to those generalities,
though they have been reached by careful
inquiry and though they are so clear as to
enjoy some probability, may have to be set
aside while the moral judgment follows the
generality which is "in possession." This
must be done until the contrary conclusion
has been demonstrated to have the "weight
of probability," or even to be probable beyond reasonable doubt, depending upon the
moral interests secured by maintaining the
generality in possession.
Thus, for example, any law already enacted, when its character as a just law is to
be tested by one or several of the principles
we have described, enjoys the favor of a
generality in possession. Human laws do
not, generally, violate higher law. Human
lawmakers are, generally, legitimate, and
generally, do not act without jurisdiction or
competence. Human laws, generally, are
directed to the common good, and they are,
generally, equitable.

